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Abstract
This paper addresses the problem of setting take-or-pay contracts in the
Technologies. Lucent creates contracts with external suppliers to hedge against
uncertainty in their customers' demand. Lucent also contracts with external customers to
hedge against the risk of incurring penalties from contracts with external suppliers. Our
problem, the make-buy-sell problem, is not well researched, yet it is fully motivated by
reality. In the make-buy-sell problem, the central player, Lucent Technologies, must
answer two questions simultaneously. The·first question is how much internal demand
should be satisfied with produced items and how much should be satisfied with
purchased items. The second question is how much owned capacity should be dedicated
to the internal customer and how much should be reserved for external customers. We
present a two-stage stochastic mixed-integer programming model with recourse to
determine an optimal set ofplayers with whom to develop contracts and the optimal
levels of those contracts given a set ofparameters defining the contracts. Sources of
uncertainty include the demand of an internal customer, as well as the demand of external
customers. We design and implement experim~nts to analyze the effects ofthese
parameters and the effect of a customer's demand pattern. We show that the particular
parameters defined in a contract strongly affect the size of the contract. But, more
importantly, the demand pattern of a customer significantly impacts the effect these
parameters have on contract levels.
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----- - --------~~
Chapter 1. Introduction
. .
,The semiconductor industry has seen tremendous growth in the latter half of last
century. And, it is now considered a vital part ofthe economy. However, due to its
c~~~·~~~..........~~-=--.=-~-.o-~o.=-...-=~_-,o= ~~..~. •_-e-:~~.: __._ ~_~~ __ '. '~' ~_~.~"""'; __"__~"""~_"--:-_~~~''~ ,_---=,,___._,~ . '
youth, new facets of this growing industry are still being discovered~~iV1anufacffi:refSin
the semiconductor industry are frantically trying to maintain a stable business in a highly
dynamic market. Product and process complexities seem to be growing exponentially.
Meanwhile, customer demand remains highly difficult to forecast, and customers seem
.increasingly intolerant of any manufacturing variability.
Customer demand has always been somewhat volatile. Customers have always
preferred not to wait to have their orders filled; What is so unique about the
semiconductor industry in this regard? T~~jynamics ofthe semiconductor industry are
substantially greater than most other manufacturing industries.
First ofall, products are'often subject to short life cycles. This makes customer
demand difficult to forecast at each tier of the supply chain. Because of this, customers
of semiconductor manufacturers are unwilling to wait to have their orders filled. It is
common for a customer to place an order in the morning and expect a delivery that same
day. ):'he problem with this, from the manufacturer's viewpoint, is that cycle time in the
first stage ofproduction alone is roughly sixty days.
Increased inventory levels would be an obvious solution. Unfortunately,
inventory is extremely expensive in this industry. Due to the short product life cycles,
prices tend to decline rapidly over time.. Also, there is a substantial risk of the product
------_-lbu;;e'1.<JcoUJm.llllinleg>--!oJJ.b~su.ollSi.l.'ete__'_T.hese factors contribute to the high cost of inventory. It is much
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preferred to produce according to forecasts and plan to hold a minimal amount of
inventory.
This introduces a new question: Since there is a limited amount of inventory, will
a grave opportunity cost for manufacturers. Is capacity expansion the key? Not quite.
Capacity is extremely capital intensive for semiconductor manufacturers. A wafer fab
might cost in th~ vicinity of 2 billion dollars. To install enough capacity to meet all
customer demand would be disastrous - utilization and profits would decline sharply.
In an effort to improve shipping performances.while increasing capacity
utilization, semiconductor manufacturers negoti1ite take-or-pay contracts with each other.
They buy and sell units of capacity, starts, laterally. Manufacturers have three potential
avenues: they can use their internal capacity to fill their own internal demand, the
standard business practice; they can purchase capacity from other manufacturers to fill
their own internal demand, a form of limited outsourcing; they can use their internal
capacity to fill other manufacturers' .demand, comparable to foundry activity.. This is the
make-buy-sell problem. We present a two-stage stochastic mixed-integer program with
recourse to determine an optimal set ofplayers with whom to develop contracts and the
optimal level.of those contracts, given a set ofparameters defining the contracts.
3
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1.1. Review of Literature
Bhatnagar et al. (1999) studied capacityallocation and capacity expansion in t1e
semiconductor industry. They discuss, at the wafer fabrication level, capacity allocation
-,--- ~-~----_-:_-~~ri~;;~d-;;~t~ co~peting for the same capacity and wlici1ffi-;<i<l ~itaitid~ai~~I5aciiy:>n_- __ -
They develop a Markov decision process model to do this. In their test problems, they
consider both stochastic and deterministic demands. A key point of this work is their use
of a very flexible cost structure to capture the complex costing of a semiconductor
-fabrication environment. Rajagopa1anet al. (1998) consider the capacity expansion
problem when the magnitude and timing of technological advances are uncertain.
Although capacity expansion is a key issue for semiconductor manufacturers, due to-the
capital intensity and long lead-time of such endeavors, it is far too impractical a solution
for our problem.
Another related question is the well-known make-or-buyquestion. Gordon
(1993) maximizes advantage-in-making through the use ofa simple linear program.
Veuge1ers and Cassiman (1999) discuss make and huy strategies while.considering size
of company and the industry of the company. McIvor et al. (1997) illustrate the
importance of considering overall corporate strategy in make or buy decisions. The
make-or-buy decision is a question of sourcing. This approach does not adequately
address the problem here. First, some items must be produced in-house as that is the core
of the business. And, if capacity is not bought from an outside source and excessive
inventory is not maintained orders will be lost. S~cond, the make-or-buy decision is
made with regard to a particular demand pattern. In our case, the demand pattern is part
of the question. There is the base internal demand that must be met. However, there is
4
realizing that capacity will be restricted. In this paper, Carr and Lovejoy deal solely with
.
contracts with external customers and assume that the per-unit-price is constant across all
also the demand from external customers. These customers and their demands can be
Q
chosen based on available supply. The make-buy-sell problem requires solving the
problem of dealing with external suppliers and external customers simultaneously.
.---------
-
Carr and Lovejoy (2000) choose optimal demand portfolios based on capacity,
. customers. They classify this problem as the inverse newsvendorproblem. The goal is
to optimally fill capacity by creating a demand portfolio from an opportunity set which
describes the feasible demand patterns. This assumes some pre-determined level of
capacity. Even if capacity were stochastic, that would not be enough because in the
make-buy-sellproblem, the central player has control over the level of capacity by
changing outsourcing levels. Contracts must be established with external customers and
external suppliers at the same time.
Most of the literature involving reserving capacity revolves around the use of
take-or-pay contracts. In a somewhat generic setting, Grossman et al. (2000) develop a
tool for negotiating contracts with stochastic demand and capacity. The negotiated take-
or-pay contract commits the purchaser to a fixed periodic quantity at a fixed price. Their
tool is a Markovian model that calculates the expected costs of a contract. The authors
point out that successful negotiating requires an understanding of economics and strategic
issues; therefore, negotiators are often senior level executives. Their goal is to develop a
quick and accurate real-time negotiation aid. In comparing their process to a simulation,
the authors indicate that the substantial,computation time required in addition to the
necessary output an~lysis make Monte Carlo simulation a poor tool for negotiators, even
5
though a high degree of accuracy is possible~ However, there .are benefits to simulation
suchas a more complete riskanalysis. Also, extending this model to allow for quantities
.{
taken in a period to be within a range instead ofbeing fixed would greatly complicate
amilysisand add computation time. Nonetheless; they do provide a basis for a practical
contract negotiating aid under uncertainty.
Even though take-or-pay contracts are a fairly recent phenomenon in the
. semiconductor industry, they have been used often in the energy sector. Wu et al. (2000)
devise a von Stackelberg game between a power supplier and a customer. The supplier is
the leader. In this game, the only uncertainty is the spotprice, and any demand in excess
of the contract may be purchased from the spot market. They then extend their model to
the situation dealing with multiple customers and eventually to the situation dealing with
multiple customers and multiple suppliers. Demand in the semiconductor industry is
much too volatile to not be a major cause ofuncertainty.
C. Schultz (1997) presents multiperiod planning models fortake-or-pay contract
decisions in the natural resources· arena. These models are mixed-integer deterministic -
mathematical programs. He acknowledges that a weakness of this approach is the lack of
stochastic demand. He suggests that the impact of uncertainty in the demand forecast pe
minimized through the use ofsafety stock and/or a rolling horizon. He considers various
suppliers and a set ofpotential contracts. His model then selects atake-or-pay contract to
develop with each site and determines the level of the contract over the planning horizon.
Schultz also extends his model to consider a variety of different take-or-pay provisions.
He concludes by discussing that contract portfolio strategies that minimize cost are not
enough. Due~e enormous take-or-pay liabilities in the natural gas industry, ensuring
6
sufficient supply to meet demands is vitaL Again, demand in the semiconductor industry
is far too volatile to be consideredin this way.
By employing a stochastic programming model, we are able to capture the
stochastic nature of the demand. Johnson et al. (2000)focus·on solving mixed-integer
programming problems, but they do discuss stochastic integer programming. Caroe and
R. Schultz (1999) present amethod of dual decomposition for solving stochastic integer·
programs. R. Schultz et al. (1998) provide a means of solving stochastic programs with
integer recourse through enumeration. Klein Haneveld and van der-V-Ierk (1999)-su~e-'Y' . _~__
structural properties of and algorithIns for stochastic integer programs. Theyfocus on
two-stage models with mixed-integer recourse.
"
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Chapter 2. Background and Problem Description
2.1. Lucent Technologies Microelectronics Division
For'the lasttwenty years, electronics production has grown faster than any other
industry. A $144 billion industry, the semiconductor manufacturing jndustry is not
without its costs. Semiconductor manufacturing-firms, such as Lucent Technologies
Microelectronics Division, 'are characterized by very high costs and low flexibility. The
cost of building a fab is over $1.3 billion and, in some cases, is even greater than $2
~--._._-- ._._---._-----~--
----~ --
billion. This cost increases with each advancement in techno1ogy.'-Tllis-capitarrnteiisity
is complicated by the l~ng lead-time in getting the fabon-line. Currently,it takes over a
year to design and build a fab, down considerably from recent years. But, that does not
include the time it takes to get the fab running at full potential. The lead-time associated
with bringing a new facility on-line is particularly long when compared to the short life
cycles ofthe products.
Product life cycle in this industry is typically measured in months. It is
reasonable to expect that once a fab is on-line, a firm has only six months to recoup the
cost of the fab. Beyond that point, earnings, from the associated product may be well past
their peak and in steady decline. These short product life cycles and falling prices are
due to the increasingly aggressive competition in semiconductor manufacturing. This
competition also results in an extremely volatile market. As new technologies are
developed, customers will shift their demand from one supplier to another in an attempt
to stay ahead of their competition.
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Additionally, customers are looldilg for lower prices, increl:ised reliability: and,
most importantly, high shipping performance. Typically, customers will disclose order
information with Lucent Technologies for each day of some horizon. Each day, this data
is updated and can deviate from its most recent forecast by as much as 100% for certain
customers. Lucent ships end-items daily to meet, as best as possible, that day's updated
demand.
With such great demand volatility, it is highly undesirable to build to forecasts of
~-----demand-very-far-into-the-future;~lJnfortunateIYj~due-the-lengthy-manufacturingJead-
times, manufacturers have no choice. Wafer fabrication, just one stage of the
- manufacturing process, can take approximately sixty days. Wafers must be started at
least two months before the orders for those wafers are realized.
Long lead-times make holding inventory inevitable. This is highly unattractive,
though. Due to the short productlife cycles and falling prices, inventory is very costly in
this industry, with one month of inventory approximating $40 million. These costs have
motivated manufacturers to find an alternate method of achieving desired shipping -
performances.
(
O~e emerging method is the use of take-or-pay contracts to exchange Jab capacity
between two manufacturers. These contracts detail levels ofcapacity to be exchanged
and lock in unit prices for capacity. Contracts are typically negotiated about two quarters
in advance and have duration of one quarter. Benefits of this practice include some
reasonable guarantee of available capacity for the future in case ofhigh levels of
customer .demand. Another benefit is the increase ip. capacity utilization from selling
-- - -- ------------- - - - --- --- - - -- ----- - - ----------
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capacity to other manufacturers - although not a motivation, this is a highly desirable
effect due to the enonnous cqst of a fab.
Consider the following situation (with disguised data) as an example. Lucent
Technologies has a fixed capacity of 10,000 starts per month. The cost of this capacity is
spread evenly over the number of started starts. At full capacity, this cost is roughly $750
pet start. There is also a variable cost per start.•This is the cost of the silicon wafers, and
is roughly $250 per start, making a total cost of about $1000 per start. A typical gross
-~c-profitmarginonwafersstarted on owned capacity and sold to an internalcustomer - for
further production and eventual end-item sale- is about 60%. This translates to a selling
price, at the fab level, of $2500 per start.
When purchasing starts from another manufacturer, or external supplier, Lucent
realizes a slightly lessened margin. Because of the leverage afforded to Lucent in
negotiating these contracts, a common per-unit-price on starts mightbe $1125, resulting
in a gross profit margin forLucent of 55%. Aside from a slightly narrower gross profit
margin, purchasing starts has other negative side effects. One, the utilization of owned
capacity is not increased by a purchased start. Next, the fixed charge of capacity cannot
be charged to a purchased start. This could make starts started on owned capacity seem
more expensive, from an accounting point ofview.
Selling starts to other manufacturers, or external customers, realizes·the narrowest
of gross profit margins. On average, Lucent can charge a per-unit-price of $i 175 for a
start. Since a start sold to an external customer must be produced in-house, the margin
for these starts is around 15%. This is not enough to be truly attractive, but it does offset
the added cost ofpurchasing starts. This relatively poor profit margin has a second
10
effect: it discourages a manufacturer from behaving as a foundry. The core business for
the fab is to fill internal customers' orders.
The leading disadvantage ofusing take-or-pay contracts is the huge risk involved.
o
These ~ontracts tend to have large penalties, which make the negotiations of these
contracts that much more critical. Particularly since contracts are created to deal with
both external suppliers and external customers, it is extremely difficult to negotiate all the
Contracts such that the overall risk is minimized. Currently, there is very little structure
-and global strategy-involved in-negotiating-these contracts..Each-contractis.handled
individually and in an impromptu manner.
Negotiating these contracts is extremely complicated. Determining the proper
level of the contract so far into the future under such uncertain demand is quite difficult.
However, negotiators do not start the process over each quarter. In order to maintain
some sense of continuity fro~ one contract period to the next, manufacturers restrict the
degree of change between consecutive contract levels. Typically, the size of a contract
cannot vary by more than 20% of the preceding contract.
The addition of the common price greatly increases the complexity of the
problem. Buyers and sellers of capacity are not strictly limited to their contract levels. If
a customer's demand is high in a particular period, that customer may purchase starts in
excess of the specified contract level if there is sufficient supply. This is termed buying
excess reserves. The price at which excess reserves are exchanged is the common price,
and is a factor of supply and demand in a particular period. The common price is
11
-~--_._-'_._---------.- - ~~~~~-
----------_._--------.,-----'-- .
Lucent Technologies wants to understand more fully the risks involved in sub-
optimal contract configurations. Our objective is to investigate the effects of specific
contract parameters a~d the effects of different customer deJ!land patterns under the
highly stochastic nature of the semiconductor market. The following section provides a
detailed explanation of the contract parameters.
12
2.2. Take-or-PayCon~ct Structure
. . A take-or-pay contract is negotiated between two manufacturers. One
manufacturer is the supplier and is dealing with an external customer. The other
manufacturer is the customer - external to the supplier - and is dealing with an external
. .
supplier. The specifics ofthe contract are largely dependent on the strength ofthe
negotiating companies. For instance, larger, more stable companies have leverage over
, ,
companies with s~aller market share.
We consider a. -singletakc-='or-paY-coritfact structure. This configuration seems to
be the dominant contract structure in the semiconductor industry. 'The key components of
the contract are thenominallevel and theper-unit-price ofwafer starts (capacity). The
per-unit-price is simply the amount the customerpays the supplier for a single wafer start
when no penalties are applied. The nominal level is the number of wafer starts
guaranteed to the customer by the supplier, at the per-unit-price. Also specified in the
contract is a take-or-pay level in number ofwafer starts. The take-or-pay level is the
minimum number ofwafer starts the customer must pur~hase from the supplier in order
to avoid penalties. If the customer does not buy enough wafer starts to satisfy the take-
or-pay level, a penalty applies to each wafer start short of the take-or.,pay level. As an
example, if the take-or-pay level is 3500 wafer starts, but the customer orders only 2000
wafer starts,the customer must pay the per-unit-price for each of the 2000 ordered starts.
Additionally, the customer must pay the take-or-pay penalty, typically 50% of the per-
unit-price, for each of the 1500 starts not purchased from the supplier under the take-or-
pay level.'
13
___e:....:::...... !_
Another level often included in contracts is the upside. The upside is the number
ofwafer starts above nominal to which th~ customer is guaranteed access. These starts
are subject to an upside premium,perhaps 20% of the per-unit-price. As an example, if
the nominal level of a contract is 5000 starts and the upside is 20%, the customer is
guaranteed access to a total of 6000 starts. If the customer buys 5000 starts, only the per-
unit-price is paid for each start. If the customer purchases 6000 starts,.the customer then
pays 6000 * (per-unit-price) plus 1000 times the upside premium.
. .. -~-Justas the· customer must pay a penalty for purchasingfewer starts thanindicated _
in the contract, the supplier must be penalized for not selling to the customer starts that
the customer requested. The supplier must pay a recoup cost to the customer against any
guaranteed start that the supplier failed to sell to the customer. As the other specified
penalties, this recoup cost is expressed as a percentage ofthe per-unit-price.
Although the various levels are usually expressed in number of wafer starts, in
this model, only the nominal level is in terms of the number of starts. The other levels
are expressed as a percentage of nominal. The take-:or-pay level and upside, along with
~ ..
the per-unit-price, take-or-pay penalty, upside premium and recoup cost, define the
strategy one manufacturer takes with another. They are provided to the model as
parameters. The model answers the following question: Given a set of customers and
suppliers, each with a defined contract strategy and a set ofmarket scenarios, should a
particular contract be accepted, and, if so, for how much?
Finally, the length of the contract is specified. In this case, the contracts typically
span a single fiscal quarter. Interestingly, contracts are usually created at least two
quarters in advance. In quarter one, a contract would be created to cover quarter three, or
some later quarter. Due to the extremely volatile nature of demand, there isa very low
level of accuracy of demand forecasted this Hlr into the future.
There is another costassociated with a contract. This cost, however, is not
"
specified in the contract. There is a fixed cost associatedwith each contract that
addresses the time and cost ofmaintaining the 7ontract.
Our objective was to researchthe effects ofvarious contract parameters under
different market scenarios. We propose a stochastic mixed-integer programwith
recourse to find optimal contract levels given a particular set of strategic parameters and
supply and demand data.
----- -- -
- -- - - - ------ - -- - -- -----._---,,--
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Chapter 3. A Stochastic Mixed-Integer Programming Model for the
Semiconductor Make-Buy-Sell Problem
3.1. Model Description
We propose a two-stage stochastic mixed-integer program with recourse. We do
not consider multiple stages in this model. Our goal is to find insight in the relationship
of contract parameters to uncertain demand. Therefore, it is important to focus on the
immediate problem of establishing contracts. We then relax the constraints relating a
contract being considered to its predecessor.
The model uses supply and forecasted demand levels ofpotential external
suppliers and internal and external customers to create market scenarios. These scenarios
make up one fiscal quarter, the length of a contract.
It would be preferable to add as much detail to the recourse stage as possible.
Thus, modeling all thirteen weeks of the quarter is desirable. However, this would be
much too unwieldy. Due to the volatility of demand, forecasts this far into the future are
highly unreliable. Therefore, a high degree of accuracy within the quarter is-unnecessary.
It is not necessary to model all thirteen weeks of the quarter in the recourse stage of the
model. Time periods can be aggregated, thereby reducing the total number of scenarios.
It is important to realize that capacity is being managed, not products. We had
considered, at first, modeling products, but this provided many complications. First, with
products come inventory. There are some complicated costs involved in this inventory.
Second, production is subject to lead-time and random yields. Adding lead-time and
----yieldstothemodel wouldgreatly-increase-thecomplexity-of-the-recourse stage. In_ordec
16
to combat this, we assumed capacity would be traded. This is actually quite a realistic
assumption. Because of the long lead-time, players often deal in starts.
Through the use ofthis stochastic programming model, we can compare the
effects of different strategies under different market scenarios. We can also determine
which contract strategy should be chosen for a particular external entity under different
market scenarios. Customers and suppliers are differentiated by contract strategies and
by demand/supply levels. The objective ofthe model is to choose contracts to maximize
profitunder a distribution of forecasted scenarios.
Formulation
Notation:
c = LEe denotes external customers
s =1.. Es denotes external suppliers
t =l.. T denotes time periods
~ 1 ...... denotes market scenarios= .. .!:::J.
Parameters:
Ct = owned capacity at time t
Sst = supply of external supplier sin time t
h = per-unitcost to start a wafer on internal capacity
1t~ = probability of realizing scenario ~
P~ = common price ofwafer starts in scenario ~
---_._----------_. - - _~_----- ------
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It is important to note that although demand forecasting is well studied, supply
forecasting is not. There is no data available to suggest aparticular distribution
associated with uncertain supply. Therefore, we consider the supply of each supplier to
be known with·100% certainty in the first stage. This has some side effects: one is that
the level ofa contract with a supplier will not exceed the available supply. The second is
that the supplier will not miss any orders made under the available supply - therefore, no
recoupment penalties will be paid by the supplier.
Random Variables:
. .
DJr = demand of external customer c in time t under market scenario ~
0/S = demand of internal customer in time t under market scenario .~
Strategic Parameters (Each of the following are indexed by c and s):
f = fixed cost associated with selecting acontract with external player
T = take-or-pay level, as a percent ofnominal
U = upside, as a percent ofnominal
ep = per-unit-price of a wafer start
r = take-or-pay penalty, as a percentage of ep
y = upside premium, as a percentage of ep
lJf = recoupment as a percentage of (p
~~ ~I~
-_..•_----._~ ..
---- -'---------
----------
---- --.._----- --- '---.- ._~-----------. --.----
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------.---------c- --;--- I _
Decision Variables:
First Stage:
o =e
if accept contract with external customer c
otherwise
if accept contract with external supplier s
otherwise
Xc = nominal level ofcontract with external customer c
Ws = nominal level of contract with external supplier s
Second Stage:
I;
=Yet
I;
=Zst
ml; =t
number of starts sold to external customer c in time t under scenario ~
number of starts.received from external supplier s in time t under scenario ~
number ofneeded starts left uncovered by supply at time t under scenario ~
Profit Functions:
A key point of our model is the profit functions. The following two functions
were designed to capture the costs associated with take-or-pay contracts as accurately as
possible. Such accurate profit functions do complicate the model, placing detailed
piecewise-linear functions in the recourse stage. However, the detail of these functions is
necessary to adequately investigate the effects and interactions of the parameters of the
contract. This also applies to the use of the common price. Although, it does complicate
_____. Jh:~.l.ecourse, it i~_~_:"~II_~~a~ factor of this problem. We do not perform complete
analysis on the common price, but its inclusion maintains a great deal of the real problem.
19
p, ( W" ~ z;, )~ th~ profit function associated with buying waf~r starts under contract
cPs Lz:r"
t
=
cPs Lz:r + YscPs(LZ:r - Wi)'
t t"
~,(I+U,}w,+Y,<Pp,w, +P'(~z;, -(1+u,}w;).
TsWs< LZ;t ::;; Ws
t
Ws < LZ;t ::;;(l+UJws
t
{I +UJws .( LZ;t
t
r, (x"~D;, ,~y;, )~ the profit function associated with selling wafer starts under
contract
<P,~y;, _coP,<p,(min(~DM +u,k} ~y;,J
<p,~y;, +r,<p,(T,X, -~y;,).
<P,~y;, +Y,<p,(~y;, -x,).
<P,(1+U,)x, +Y,<P,u,x, +P'(~y;, -(I+U,k).
LY;t ::;; Tcxc
t
Tcxc < LY;t ::;; Xc
t
Xc < LY;t ::;; (1 + Uc)xc
t
(1 +Uc )xc < LY;t
t
The first condition in rc(xc,LD~,LY;t) is therecoupment condi~ion. If it
t t "
___ __ apPlies,then.it p:ee~Pts:yother profit functions in +" ~D;" ~y;.). The previous
------_.'_.. -_.._-----~_._._._- "._---------",,-- .- _-.-.._-----._._,._-
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limeport p, (w, ,~z;, ) does not have a recoupment condition for the following reason.
There is insufficient information to devise a distribu:tion around the available supply at a
given external supplier. Therefore, we assume the level of supply available is known
with 100% certainty. Furthermore, since no information is known regarding the
possibility of a supplier to deny access to his capacity, it is assumed that a supplier will
not short an external customer because the penalties are too-high,
1<1(x"~D;, ) ~ cost motivation for setting nominal atan acceptablelevel by customer
,. .
=rt~r]Je Xe-8eLD~
I
First Stage:
z =max[- LIe8e - Lfs8s]+Lrt~Q~(X,w,8)
e s ~
subject to
._-~-;~ - -
e
ws (1 +Us)~ 8sL SsI
I
x, w~° 8E {0,1}
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'Vs
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Second Stage:
subject to
0 1; +" I; "I; I; < CI LJYc1 - LJZsl -m, - I
C S
:~:>~ ::;;(l+UJws 'tis
I
or
LY~I ::;;(l+UJxc 'tic
'tit
'tit
'tIet
'tis
'tit
'tIcst
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
The objective ofboth stages is to maximize profit. In the first stage, the model is
maximizing expected profit. The three terms in the first stage objective function
represent setup costs and the expected value ofthe market scenarios. The setup costs
discourage creating an excessive number of contracts and can be skewed in favor ofsome
external entities over others.
Constraint set (1) keeps the total number ofwafer starts guaranteed to external
customers to be. less than total capacity for the quarter. All external customer orders must
--- -.- - ------. -- - ._._- ----
be met with internal capacity (i.e., a manufacturer may not sell starts purchased from an
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external supplier to an external customer). This will help to insure manufacturers do not
engage in foundry activities.
Constraint sets (2) and (3) have two purposes. First, they keep the model from
setting nominal levels for external players with which a contract was not established, by
use of the binary vector 8. Second, they place limits on individual contract nominal
levels. No contract, regardless ofhow attractive, can be greater than the maximum
supply ofa supplier or the maximum expected demand of that customer. This is
necessary because there is no other input from the external players about what nominal to
set other than their supply and/or expected demand. It is assumed that external players
typically desire. a contract nominal level close to their demand/supply.
Constraintset (4) as well as constraint set (10) are the nonnegativity constraints.
Constraint set (4) also defines the range for 8.
The second stage is the recourse stage. Here, the model chooses the best actions
given the decisions from stage one. The objective is to maximize profits. The function
K; (x" ~D~ ) .is designed to encourage the model to keep.contract nominal level close
to the expected demand of external customers. Since a customer needs a certain number
, of orders to be met and a supplier is happy to sell any underutilizedcapacity, it is more
important that the nominal level favor the customer's demand than the supplier's supply.
The use of 1t~ in this function flattens the function when scenarios have a lesser
probability of occurring and maintains a sharper slope when scenarios have a greater
probability ofoccurring. So, the more accurate a customer's forecast within a scenario,
-~'-"----_._'-- -_. _." --- ---~----
-- --------~--------
- ----- ----~---- ------
the more important it is to approximate total demand ofthat scenari~.-------_·
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Constraint sets (5) through (10) are indexed by scenario. All·ofthese constraints
must be maintained within each individual scenario. Constraint sets (5) and(6) are the
capacity constraints. Constraint set (5) is also a flow balance constraint, requiring all
demand be less than supply plus a heavily penalized slack variable, m;. This slack
variable represents the number of starts left uncovered by supply and is needed to
maintain feasibility. It is entirely conceivable that internal orders in some scenario will
be so high as to exceed all possible supply and capacity. In this case, it is necessary to
short the internal customer, and 11!JF. providesthe means to do that. Notice that constraint
set (5), with a slack variable, is not comprised of equality constraints. This is because
there is no penalty for underutilizing capacity. Although it is desirable to maintain high
levels·ofutilization, inflating contract levels specifically to improve utilization could be
devastating.
Constraint set (6) requires the total number of starts sold to external customers in
each time period be less than capacity. Any starts sold to external customers must be
from internal capacity. By requiring the total number of starts sold to external customers
be less than capacity, we are insuring that those starts may be filled using owned
capacity.
Constraint set (7) is the set of the demand constraints. This set of constraints
serves two purposes. First, it ensures that no starts will be sold to a customer without an
existing contract. Second, it keeps all starts sold to an external customer less than or
equal to the demand of that customer.
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Constraint set (8) is the set of supply constraints. These constraints parallel
constraint set (7) in that no starts may be purchased without a contract, and with a·
contract the purchase of starts is limited by the supply ofthat particular supplier.
Constraint set (9) consists of either-or constraints. These constraints guarantee
that a manufacturer will not deal as a foundry by specifying that either starts may be sold
or purchasedin excess of a contract, but not both.
In dealing with excess reserves, either buying or selling, the common price is .
detennined by the market and is considered constant regardlessoftheplayerandhisrole.
This price is also extremely volatile and difficult to predict. For this reason, we do not
model this parameter as a random variable with a known distribution, but rather a
parameter set by some outside force - the market.
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3.2. Model Analysis
We implemented our model in'AMPL, interfacing with CPLEX 7.0, as a
deterministic mixed-integer program; One of the complicating factors of this problem is
that the first stage decisions ofnominal levels ofa contract affect the second stage in the
placement ofbreakpoints along a pIecewise-linear cost function. Another is that as the
number ofscenarios and the number ofexternal players increase, the model becomes
more and more unwieldy.
Using a decomposition technique is an obvious potential solution. Note that, with
the exception of the either-or constraint, constraint set (9), there are no binary variables in
the recourse. The first stage decisions are parameters to the recourse; hence, binary
variables are not needed to connect them to the second stage decision variables.
Constraint set (9) can be relaxed and, seemingly, a decomposition method, such as L-
shaped, or Bender's, may be applied.
There are two difficulties in this. First is the construction of the piecewise-linear
function in the recourse stage. AMPL provides a mechanismto model piecewise-linear
curves without explicitly defining binary variables. Unfortunately, this mechanism
translates to an equivalent linear program only two special cases ofpiecewise-linear
programs. All other cases ofpiecewise-linear programs are translated to equivalent
mixed-integer programs. Those two special cases are minimizing a separable convex
piecewise-linear function and maximizing a concave piecewise-linear function.
The profit function from selling starts to external customers is generally convex
_______ and the cost function from purchasing starts from external suppliers is generally concave
-------~- -- -- _._._--_ .•...•...,----- --_._----~---_._---_._-_._--~-----_._-.
(since it is negative, as the purchased starts increase in number, the cost grows
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downward, away from zero). While these functions are separable, the profit function
from selling start.s to external customers does not fall into one of the categories described
above. So, AM~L translates the current recourse program into a mixed-integer program.
Additionally, there are times when the profit function and the cost function are not
convex and concave, respectively. Within the contract, the curves are decidedly convex
and concave. However, when considering the price of starts beyond the upside level in
the contract, this property may be lost.
Consider the profit function from selling starts, r,(x" ~D;', ~y;,), depicted in
Figures 1and 2. The three breakpoints are associated with the first stage decision
variable x. The slopes are defined within the profit function. Note that the recoupment
function is not displayed here. Figure 1 represents the profit function when
rx x x(l+U)
Figure 1. Convex Profit Curve
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pi;> lP(l +Y). In this case the function is convex. If, however, pi; < lP(l +Y), this curve
,
will not be a convex function. Figure 2 is representative of this case.
These difficulties make more attractive the idea ofmapping this two stage
stochastic program into a deterministic mixed-integer program. The primary concern
with this is the inefficiency associated with solving mixed-integer programs. The
Fx .x x(l+U)
'--._---,_. ---
Figure 2. Non-Convex Profit Curve
program would need to be kept fairly small. Since the number of scenarios has a
profound effect on the number ofbinary variables - the binary variables are almost all
indexed by scenario - the number of scenarios must be kept in check.
We mapped this two stage stochastic program into a deterministic mixed-integer
program. At first, the model was coded with a single variable for the number of starts
sold and a single variable for the number of starts bought (both indexed by time period,
--- -----
scenario,-and external player).--Binary,variiibieswere-tise'd'm-deterrnine'which'segment---'-------
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of the profit functions applied. This provedto be fairly inefficient. A slight modification
yielded a significant improvement.
Using one variable for each slope and binary variables to determine when which
variable was applicable solved in considerably less time than the previous method. For
I'
instance, now there are four variables dealing with the number ofunits sold to an external
customer. They are Y~t' Y~ct' yt, Y:Ct ~ o. Y~t is a portion of the number of starts sold to
an external customer in time period t under the given scenario. This variable ranges from
oto the take-or-pay level. yL ranges from o. to Nominal level minus the take-or-pay
level. Y;ct ranges from 0 to the Upside level minus the Nominal level. Finally, Y:Ctis
greater than or equal to O. The sum of these four variables is then the total number of
starts sold to an external customer within a time period under a given scenario.
It was necessary to add binary variables to determine when one of the above four
vanabies was appropriate to change. To switch between Y~t and ytt' the binary
variable ~; is used. The four constraints outlined illustrate its use.
2>~t ~~xc
t
Tcxc- LY~t ~M/3;
t
(7a)
(7b)
(7c)
(7d)
--.---------- .__ c. _
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The first constraint set, (7a), dynamically sets the upper limit for the variable Y~t'
The second constraint forces ~~ to lJe 1 if Y~t is less than the take-or-pay level. Note
that if Yl~t is greater than or equal to the take-or-pay level the value of ~~ may be 0 or 1.
This discrepancy is resolved in the third constraint. Co~straint set (7c) will limit ytt to 0
if Yl~t does not equal the take-or-pay level. Otherwise, yL will be limited by the fourth
constraint. A similar technique is used to switch between ytt and Y;ct , as well as Y;ct
1; .
and Y4ct'
The variables representing the number of starts bought from an external supplier
did not present the same problems as did the sold variables. The fact that this is a
maximization function and the profit realized from buying starts is negative - a cost -
provides a natural way around some of these binary variables. We have two variables,
Z~st,ztt ~ 0, as opposed to four, for starts bought from an external supplier. Z~t
represents the number of starts bought from an external supplier under contract, and, thus,
is limited by the upside of the contract. ztt is 0 until Z~t equals the upside specified in
the contract. The use of these two variables is quite similar to the construct illustrated for
1; ·d 1; .Ylct an Y2ct'
The cost functions for purchased starts are defined to be negative. Therefore,
when maximizing the objective, the solver will make these functions as small as possible.
The functions are constrained in the following manner.
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penalty; ,premium; ~ 0
Vs~
Vs~
Vs~
(11) /
(12)
(13)
(14)
In the first constraint set, (11), the cost function, P; ,is defined to be the per-unit-
price applied to each start bought under contract plus the take-or-pay penalty function
and the upside premium function and the common price applied to starts purchased above
the contract level, Ztl' The entire value ofthis function will be less than or equal to O.
In constraint set (12), the take-or-pay penalty is applied tothe appropriate number
of starts, those not purchased under the take-or-pay level. Notice that if ~>tl is greater
I
than the take-or-pay level, the sum in parentheses would be negative, making the entire
right-hand-side positive. penalty; , however, is restricted to be non-positive. Similarly,
premium; is restricted to be non-positive. Hence, this function may be expressed as
above. Since this function is negative and part of a maximization problem, it will always
evaluate to the right-hand-side.
Again, this greatly increases the number ofbinary variables. With almost all
binary variables indexed by scenario and external player, the number of scenarios and
external players becomesvery limiting. This is discussed more in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4. Computational Experiments
There are two key points in these experiments. One is the value of solving this
problem stochastically. Is the solution to the stochastic formulation really any better than
the solution to the deterministic formulation? .The second point is in the insight. What
knowledge is gained from this model?
Before these questions can be answered, scenarios must be developed. As
mentioned previously,· the number ofscenarios created in these experiments is an
important factor. Too few scenarios and there may not be· enough information for the
model to reach a valid conclusion. Too many scenarios and the model may never reach a .
solution. There are two methods employed to keep the scenarios in check..
First, since the. forecast of demand two quarters into the future is so inaccurate,
each ofthe thirteen: weeks in the quarter to be under contract need not be individually
specified. To this end, the time periods have been aggregated. The first time period
consists ofweeks one and two. Weeks three through six are contained within time period
two. Time period three represents the other seven weeks, weeks seven through thirteen.
This is fairly realistic since the most detailed information is kno\Vl1 about the closest time
periods. As the forecast looks· out further into the future, details become shadowed by
general trends.
Another key point in reducing scenarios is the goal of this model. This model was
not designed to provide exact answers to specific questions of contract levels. Rather, the
aim of this model is. to provide insight into the relationship between particular contract
par~l!1ete~s. ~d ~i!fe~~_~t_~ar~et scenarios. W~~~ this in ~~~:__it is_c~ar~_~~~_e_ssa~ to
detail a great number of markefscenarios. Instead, only a handful of scenarios will be
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chosen - those sc~narios which both maintain the largest probability of occurrence and
which, collectively, adequately describe the inaccuracy ofthe forecasts. We have
determined that an appropriate number ofscenarios is approximately six.
Each scenario is defined by a tuple {O~ ,Dl~ ,... ,Dt ,p~}. Each tuple has a
probability ofoccurrence, 1t~. Ideally, a decision maker would have sufficient data on
hand to accurately forecast some or all ofthese random variables. Without this data,
some adaptations need to be made..
Since the common price is so volatile and impossible to predict, and also since it
is considered an external force, which we are not modeling, the common price is
randomly generated in each scenario. The common price is found by creating a random
number as a percentage of the average per-unit-price. This is done in Microsoft Excel
2000 in the following manner.
For s = 1 to Scenario Num
Randomize
pos_neg = Rnd
pct(s) = Rnd
Ifpos_neg < 0.5 Then
pct(s)=pct(s) *-1
End If
Nexts
Figure 3. Visual Basic Code to Determine Common Price
Here, pos_neg represents the decision ofwhether the common price is greater
than or less than the average per-unit-price. The Randomize function initializes the
random number generator. With no parameters, the value returned from the system timer
is used as the seed. Ifpos_neg is less than 0.5, the common price will be less than the
------- ~----------
-._'--_._._------_._--------~._._-- - .._~._._--------._---
average per-unit.:price; otherwise the common price will be greater than the average per-
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unit-price. The variable pct is a random number between 0 and 1. This value represents
the percent changecommon price is of the per-unit-price. The common price is then
found by multiplying pct by the per-unit-price averaged over all external players. In
order to allow for accurate comparisons of other parameters, once found, the common
price was kept constant for different parameter configurations. The common prices used,
as percentages of the per-unit-price, are detailed in Figure 4.
pct(1) = .4323
pct(2) =-.1705
pct(3) =-.3348
pct(4) =.6261
pct(5) = .1473
pct(6) =-.6828
Figure 4. Common Price Percentages for
Scenarios
The other members of the tuple are handled ,somewhat differently. Since only six
scenarios are being considered, they are hand chosen to represent the six most likely
, realizations. Probabilities are then assigned to each scenario based on its likelihood of
occurrence. These probabilities are created based on the knowledge and experience of
the decision maker. In case reliable information on these probabilities is not available,
the six most probable scenarios are consideredto occur with equal probability.
These scenarios are developed with low and high values for internal and external
customer demands. Considering first the demand of the internal customer, enumeration
of low and high values across three time periods yields eight sc~narios. Excluding the
r
___, tw~D extreme cases, alll~'Y~a_lu~s or all high values, gives the desired six scenarios.
--- -----~_.,-~--".",----
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Demand vector scenarios for external customers are developed in the same
fashion as for the interp.al customer. The difference with external customer demand
values is that some external customers have a strong direct correlation to the internal
LLH
LHL
LHH
HLL
HLH
HHL
FigureS. Representation.of
Low-High Scenario Set
customer's demand. Hence, for a given scenario, the correlated external customers'
demand pattern will match the internal customer's demand pattern.
Other external customers have different correlations. The values of these
customers'demands can be found by adjusting the low-high scenarios according to their
correlation. A simple example is the external customer with a demand pattern in a 180 0
phase shift from the internal customer's.demand pattern. In this·case, exchanging the
Low values for High values, and vice versa, produces the desired phase shift.
If a customer has a demand pattern in a 900 phase shift from the internal
customer's demand, the Low-High scenario set is maintained, but the scenario indices are
shifted. As an example, the internal customer views scenarios one through six in that
order, 1- 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6. The customer with a 180 0 phase shift has scenarios in the
following' order: 6 - 5 - 4 - 3 - 2 - 1. It follows, then, that the customer with a 900
phase shift will have scenarios in order 4 - 5 - 6 - 1- 2 - 3.
35
Capacity is known to be constant at 1000 units per week. Internal customer'
demand varies from 80% to 120% ofthat capacity. Each external customer's demand is,
on average, 30% of that capacity, with volatility moving demand from 10% to 50% .of
capacity. T4e sum of external customer's demands can exc~ed internal capacity.
Although not each of these customers will be considered in each run, for
convenience, Co will refer to the internal customer; CI will refer to the customer with
demand in phase with Co; C2 will be the customer with demand 900 out ofphase from Co;
and C3 will refer to the customer with demand 1800 out ofphase from the internal
customer.
Since supply from each supplier is considered to be a known amount, as a
simplification, different levels of supply contracts were not consid~red. A
straightforward, common set ofparameters was chosen for the supplier. One supplier
was modeled~sl.-The supplier,sl,-hasaconstant supply equal to 50% of internal
capacity. The contract settings for this supplier are consistent for each run. These
settings are
Table 1. Contract Parameter Values for External Supplier'
Fixed Charge Take-or-Pay Level Upside Per-Unit-Price TOP Penalty Upside Premium
1500 0.8 0.2 112.5 0.2 0.4
Contract parameters were changed for each external customer. At most, two
customers were considered at a time, and for some runs, only one customer was
considered. The runs were defined by the configuration of contract settings. These
.. -_ ... _"-~-..__..~- --_._---_._----~._ .._.~-_.~--_.-._--, ... _._.......;~.~-_.
configurations were combinations of settings for each contract parameter.'ContracC ---------
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parameters took on the values as described in Table 2. Note that the take-or-pay penalties
considered in these runs are slightly less than typical real world values. In making pilot
runs to determine parameter values that would provide interesting and insightful results,
it was determined that above 50%; the take-or-pay penalty fully dominated the other
parameters, concealing any of their effects.
Table 2. Contract Parameter Values for External Customers
Fixed Take-or- Per-Unit- TOP Upside
Upside Recoupment
Charge Pay Level Price Penalty Premium
1500 .6 0 117.5 .2 N/A 1
.8 .2 .4 .2
1 .4 .4
In all, two experiments were considered. Experiment 1 consisted of three sets of
runs, each with a single customer and a single supplier, SI. Each of these sets consisted of
30 runs, one for each configuration of contract parameter settings. Experiment 2
consisted of three sets of runs, each with two customers (CI and C2, CI and C3, C2 and C3),
and a single supplier, S I. Each of these sets consisted of 900 runs, one for each
configuration of contract parameter settings for each customer.
To address the issue of the value of the stochastic solution, Experiment 1 was
studied. Therefore, three sets of runs were made to find the value of the stochastic
solution: one for CI, C2, and C3. For each parameter configuration, the mean values of the
data were calculated and the expected value solution was found. Then, that solution was
---appliedto-thesto-chasticdatato-determine-the-expected-result-of-using-the-expected---
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solution. This value was compared to the recourse problem solution, the solution of
solving the stochastic program. For each customer, the value of the stochastic solution
depended on the parameter settings. However, the difference between the expected result
ofusing the expected solution and the recourse problem solution is consistently
significant.
Table 3. Values of Stochastic Solutions
Customer Minimum VSS (%) Average VSS (%) Maximum VSS (%)
< "
CJ 66 211 313
C2 73 110, 215
. C3 1 15 43
It should be somewhat intuitive that the value of the stochastic solution would be
considerably higher for Cj than for C3. In the expected result from using the expected
solution, the model has no.information on volatility or customer correlation. This can be
dangerous when a customer is in phase because there is little wiggle room if demands
stray from forecasted amounts. However, when external customer demand is 1800 out of
phase, in the case of C3, there is plenty ofspace available to counter decisions based on
poor forecasts. The reason the value of the stochastic solution is as high as 43% with C3,
is the lost opportunity from not knowing the demand is out ofphase.
In short, this clearly warrants using a stochastic program, as opposed to a purely
deterministic one. The results of these experiments are outlined in the next section.
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Chapter 5. Managerial Insights
When analyzing this model, there are really two factors to be considered. One
factor is the contract parameter settings; the other factor is the customer's demand
pattern. The first factor considered here is the demand pattern ofthe customer. This can
have a much greater impact than the particular parameters of the contract. Consider the
c
situation modeled in Experiment 1. In this case there is sufficient supply only to go to a
single customer. But the difference in profit can be drastic from one customer to another.
Table 4. Average Profits from runs with 1 Customer
Minimum Average Maximum
No customer -117,509 -117,509 -117,509
Cj -65,405 -47,891 -36,110
C2 14,848 37,898 90,562
C3 49,529 67,710 104,100
I
The case with customer Cj is most surprising. In this case, the optimal solution
did not generate enough profit from sales to overcome the cost ofproduction. Note that
these values do not include the amount of revenue created from selling to the internal
. .
customer but do include the cost ofproducing for the internal customer (as described
earlier). Working with Cj is clearly better than holding no external customer contract.
When not selling to an external customer, the costs are as outlined in the second row of
Table 4~ A contract with Cj is a substantial improvement over no external customer. But,
as expected, as the phase shift of the customer's demand pattern increases, so do profits.
---._--~---._-- -----
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In Experiment 2, th~s idea is maintained. In almost all cases, it is preferable to
favor the customer with the higher phase shift in the demand pattern. Regardless of the
contract designed for customer C/, it was more profitable to choose a contract with the
other customer, either C2 or C3, and choose to not have a contract with Cj. Hence, in cases
involving C/, the results were identical to the corresponding results from Experiment 1.
For the case involving customers C2 and C3, however, the contract parameter
settings did have an impact on which customer to favor. In most cases, the model
chooses customer C3 over C2. Though, when the contract for C2 is attractive enough, as
compared to c3's contract, C2 is chosen instead of C3. In order to appreciate the reasons
for choosing C2 over C3, it is first necessary to study the impacts of the contract
parameters.
In general, the take-or-:pay level and the upside define regions of interest, while
the penalty and the premium define the relative importance of those regions. There is
inevitablysome interactionbetween these parameters, but each do.es have a particular
effect as well.
To analyze the take-or-pay level, first consider the case when there is no upside
(and, hence, no upside premium). The internal customer leastaffectscustomer C3.
Therefore, the data for this customer gives the best representation of the effects of the
take-or-pay level. As the take.,or-pay level increases, generally there should be a
tendency to increase the nominal level of the contract to some value which would create a
high probability the customer would not meet the take-or-pay level. Notice, as an
extreme case, the part of the graph in Figure 6 displaying a 100% take-or-pay level with a
---~----------- --,---------- ------ -_. _.-._---_.....-.-'------_.~--_._-----~--
40% penalty. With all customers, the nominal level is set as high as possible in order to
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Figure.6. Nominal Levels Under DifferentTake-or-Pay Levels
for c;
keep the customer from actually meeting the take-or-pay level. Take-or-pay has similar
consequences with the other two customers as well, though the contracts made with these
customers are more restricted by the int~mal customer's demand, thereby distorting the
outcome. For·this reason, customer C3 will be used to illustrate further effects of contract
-'
parameters.
The amount ofpenalty applied to not meeting the take-or-pay level has the effect
onthe contract level of accentuating the effect ofthetake-or-pay level. With a small
penalty, changing the take-or-pay level has a much less significant effect on the contract
level than with a large penalty. This is to be expected.
Consider Figure 7. When the penalty is 20%, changing the take-or-pay level has a
.~ed effect on the contract level. But, wheu the penalty is 40%, the take-or-pay
level has much more impact
The upside, on the other hand, tends to decrease the leyel of the contract, as
compared to th~ take-or-pay level. There are two reasons for this. First, adding upside
--- -------..- .._--._-- ---._-----
._--------_.--_ •..- ---- ._----------
-----------.--------------_.. _...-- -_._---------
increases the value at the high end of the contract.. This makes dealing at the high end of
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Figure 7. Nominal Levels Under Different Penalties and Take-or-Pay Levels for C3
the contract more attractive. Thus, for the same level of demand, the contract is lowered
so more starts will be exchanged in the range ofthe upside.
The second reason for an increase in upside to result in a decrease in contract
level, barring any other changes, is that a simple increase in upside is equivalent to a
decrease in the take-or-pay level. Although for a high premium this effectwill not be
noticed, for standard values of the premium, this is a factor. And, since a higher take-or-
pay level results in a higher contract level, a lower take-or-pay level w~ll result in a lower
contract level.
As an example, a contract with a 100% take-or-pay level and a 40% penalty will
decrease by roughly 20% when the upside increases from 20% to 40%, considering no
change in prerium. This is a rather extreme shift, but it well illustrates the effect of the
upside outside ofparameter interaction.
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The premium behaves in a similar fashion as the take-or-pay penalty in that it
accentuates the effect of the upside. Increasing the premium, while changing no other
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Figure 8. Nominal Levels Under Different Take-or-Pays with a 20% Upside and
20% Premium
parameters, tends to increase the contract level. An optimal contract will in some
scenarios be so great that the customer will not be able to meet take-or-pay.. However, in
j"
other scenarios, that same contract should not be able to meet all the demand, thus
allowing for sales of excess reserves. By increasing the premium, the price in the range
of the upside becomes more attractive. Therefore, it becomes desirable to sell starts
under the contract prices that would otherwise have been sold as excess reserves. With a
100% take-or-pay level and a 40% upside, increasing the premium from 20% to 40%
results in a contract level increase ofroughly 13%.
When examining the interaction of these parameters, it is important to note that
there lsri6·fiiUydomiiiatingfiCtofTn setting the contract level. Under certain conditions,
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some parameters move to the foreground, while other parameters move to the
background.,
It now makes sense to deal with the values of the take-or-pay and upside regions.
The value of the take-or-pay region is made up of the take-or-pay level and the take-or-
pay penalty. An increase in either of these parameters results in an in~rease in value to
the take-or-pay region. The value of the upside region is likewise made up ofthe upside
and the premium. Again, an increase in either parameter will result in an increase in
value to the upside region.
Refer again to Figure 6, when the take-or-pay level greatly affected the contract
level. Now, notice Figure 8, with the introduction of a 20% upside and a 20% premium.
Here, with a take-or-pay penalty of 20%, the take-or-pay level has no effect at all.
However, with an increase in the penalty to 40%, a 100% take-or-pay level pushes up the
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nominal level of the contract. This happens because at this point only is there sufficient
value in the take-or-pay region to make it more desirable to receive penalties from the
customer than any premiums or excess reserve sales.
Although the general effect of the contract parameters is consistent for all
customers, the magnitude ofeffect is dependent on the customer's demand pattern: For
all customers, as the upside becomes more valuable, the nominal level ofthe contract
dec~es in order to deal more in upside starts. For customer C3, an upside of20% is
attractive enough to outweigh the benefits of the take-or-pay level. Figure 9 shows this
with a take-or-pay penalty of40%.
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Figure 10. Guaranteed Level of Contract for Cz with Different Upside Values
Customer C2, on the other hand, does not realize this shift until the upside is 40%.
This signifies that the decision makers would prefer to deal on the low end of the contract
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Customer CJ has something more interesting going on. Decision makers would
strongly prefer to deal around the take..or-pay level with this customer. With a small
level ofupside, the contract level is' decreased iIi order to gain advantages from both
penalties and premiums. However, when the upside is increased to 40%, it becomes
highly unlikely to deal with both penalties and premiums, so a choice "is made. In Figure
11, it can be seen that the contract levels increase at this point to favor receipt ofpenalties
over receipt ofpremiums. This is fairly intuitive. Customer CJ has a demand pattern in
phase with the internal customer's demand. Therefore, given the option, the decision
makers would much prefer a situation in which payment is received from CJ and the start
could still be used for the internal customer over the situation where the start was actually
sold to the external. customer.
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Figure 11. Guaranteed Level of Contract for Cl with Different Upside Values
Although the contracts for CJ favor the take-or-pay region, these contracts seem
---- ~-_._._-~---- -.---- --"--~'~.
relatively insensitive to the take-or-pay penaltY-,:",wliIcli-issomewhafexpected. The~
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demand pattern of this customer is whl:lt dictates the setting of this contract. Only in the
- .
extreme case of a 100% take-or-pay level with a full upside value (upside of40% with a
40% premium), does the penalty really make a difference. In this case, the guaranteed
level of the contract increases by about 20% for a 20% increase in penalty.
For customer C2, which is slightly out ofphase with internal demand, the penalty
is somewhat more important. When there is a 20% upside; regardless of the level of
premium, and an 80% take-or-pay level, the contract level jumps roughly 69% with a
20% increase in take-or-pay penalty. However, when the upside is increased to 40%,
with an 80% take-or-pay level, there is no effect from the penalty. It seems in this
situation, with a slight upside, the contract could be set either way, to favordealing with
penalties, or to favor dealing in premiums. A small shift in penalty results simply in
changing the focus of the contract level.
Customer C3 is much more similar to Cj regarding the effect of the take-or-pay
penalty. In most cases, the level of the penalty has little to no effect on the level ofthe
contract. However, if the value of the take-or-pay level becomes significant, the contract
will'be increased to reap the benefits of this value..This is most easily seen when the
take-or-pay level is 100%. With a 20% upside, regardless of the premium value, there is
a 40% increase in the contract level when the penalty increases by 20%. But, with a 40%
upside, the premium begins to make a difference. When the premium is 20%, a 20%
increase in penalty yields a 14% increase in contract level. When the premium is 40%,
the same increase in penalty yields an 11% increase in contract level.
RetUrning to Experiment 2, again the pattern of the external customer's demand,
as compared with the internal customer's demand pattern, is the key factor in setting
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optimal contraots. In almost all cases, it is more profitable to have a contract with a
customer whose demand has the highest phase shift from internal demand. Regardless of
the contract designed for Cj, it was more profitable to establish a contractwith the second
customer, either C2 or C3.
When the model had to choose between customers C2 and C3, the decision was a
little more difficult. Here, the decision was sensitive to the particular contract parameter-
settings chosen. Typically, C3 was considered a much better customer to have a contract
with than C2. -However, given an attractive enough contract for C2, the model would
choose C2 over C3.
Contracts with customer C3 are optimally set to favor the upside region. Contracts
with customer C2, though, aremore sensitive to the contract settings. High values in the
take-or-pay region or high values in the upside region make contracts with C2 desirable.
With a take-or-pay level of 100% and a penalty of 40%, the value ofthe take-or-pay
-_ region is high enough for C2 to be considered. With no upside, the contract for C2 was
overall more attractive than contracts with C3. The exceptions would be when the same
contract was considered for C3 - all things being equal, C3 is simply a more appealing
customer. Other exceptions were when a contract for C3 had a full value for the upside,
that is, a 40% upside with a 40% premium. Unless many starts could be sold to C3 at a
higher price than would go to C2, thanks to the upside value, the penalties received from
C2 outweighed benefits of dealing with C3.
Interestingly, when an upside was applied to the contract withc2, c; became less
appealing. With a premium of40%, regardless of the upside, the only way C2 would be
chosen over C3, would be if C3 had no upside in his contract, and the take-or-pay v~lue in
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the contract with C3 was much less than that ofc/s contract. Customer C2 would not be
considered unless C3 had less than a 100% take-or-pay lev~l.
Summarily, it is clear that customer C2 is more attractive than C3 .whendealing in
the lower end of the contract. However, when dealing in the upside region, the contract
with C3 is considerably better than a contract with C2. Albeit contract parameters affect
contract levels in a fairly unique fashion, it is important to understand the type of
customer with which the contract is being negotiated. The customer's demand pattern
should indicate the region of the contract where most value should be placed, thereby
shaping the contt:act setting strl;ltegy.
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Chapter 6. Conclusions
We present a stochastic mixed-integer program with recourse for take-or-pay
contract setting in the semiconductor industry. The decision variables represent the
choice ofwhether or not to accept a contract with a particular external player, and, once
accepted, what the nominal level of the contract with that player should be. Key inputs to
the model are a set ofparameters for each external playerin the model, which describe
the particular strategy associated with establishing a contract with the corresponding
external player.
Two experiments were considered to study the effects of the parameters specified
in the contracts as applied to customers with different demand patterns. The first
experiment was designed to provide a pure illustration of the. impact of the contract
parameters for the different customers. The other experiment was designed to study the
magnitude of impact of these parameters, as well as the impact of the demand pattern.
"
Implementation and testing of this model were performed using AMPL, as an
interface to CPLEX7.0. Microsoft Excel 20'00 was used as an interface to construct the
.data files for AMPL to send to CPLEX. Since the model is a stochastic mixed-integer
program with recourse, the number of scenarios has a profound effect on the· time it takes
to solve the model to optimality. Therefore, a select number of scenarios were chosen.
Yet, the value of the stochastic solution was significant, showing a deterministic
approach to this problem, using expected values, to be very costly.
The results.of the two experiments showed that the contract parameters do have
an effect on the size of the contract one should be willing to make with a customer. But,
more importantly, an optimal contract for one type Oicustomer is not necessarily optimal .
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for another type Of customer. The demand pattern of the customer should playa
significant role in determining the approach to establishing a contract with that customer.
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